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Only about 1% of newly developed drugs are for tropical diseases, such as African sleeping sickness, dengue fever, and leishmaniasis [1]. While patent 
incentives and commercial pharmaceutical houses have made 
Western health care the envy of the world, the commercial 
model only works if companies can sell enough patented 
products to cover their research and development (R&D) 
costs. The model fails in the developing world, where few 
patients can afford to pay patented prices for drugs. 
It is easy (and correct) to say that Western governments 
could solve this problem by paying existing institutions to 
focus on cures for tropical diseases. But sadly, there is not 
enough political will for this to happen. In any case, grants 
and patent incentives were never designed with tropical 
diseases in mind. 
Two main kinds of proposals have been suggested 
for tackling the problem. The ﬁrst is to ask sponsors—
governments and charities—to subsidize developing-
country purchases at a guaranteed price [2,3,4]. In the 
second approach, charities create nonproﬁt venture-capital 
ﬁrms (“Virtual Pharmas”), which look for promising drug 
candidates and then push drug development through 
contracts with corporate partners. In this article, we discuss 
the problems with these two approaches and suggest a third, 
“open source,” approach to drug development, called the 
Tropical Diseases Initiative (TDI). We envisage TDI as a 
decentralized, Web-based, community-wide effort where 
scientists from laboratories, universities, institutes, and 
corporations can work together for a common cause (see 
www.tropicaldisease.org).
Why Open Source?
The idea behind asking sponsors to subsidize developing 
country purchases at a guaranteed price is that this will prop 
up drug prices and restore incentives for developing new 
drugs [2,3,4]. In other words, it is a way of ﬁxing the patent 
problem. However, subsidies have an important weakness: 
it is almost impossible to correctly determine how large 
the subsidy should be. In principle, the most cost-effective 
solution is to set a subsidy that just covers expected R&D 
costs. But how large is that? R&D costs are very poorly known, 
with published estimates ranging from $100 to $500 million 
per drug [5]. If the subsidy is set too low, companies cannot 
cover their R&D costs and nothing will happen. Set the 
subsidy too high, and the sponsor’s costs skyrocket. To date, 
no sponsor has tried to implement these proposals.
In the “Virtual Pharma” approach, governments and 
philanthropies fund teams to search out and subsidize the 
most promising private and academic research. Examples 
include the Institute for One World Health (www.iowh.org), 
a not-for-proﬁt pharmaceutical company funded mainly 
through private sources and the Gates Foundation, and the 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (www.dndi.org), a 
public sector not-for-proﬁt organization designed to mobilize 
resources for R&D of new drugs for neglected diseases.
Virtual Pharmas have clearly started to bear fruit, and 
are responsible for most candidate treatments for tropical 
diseases currently under development. For example, the 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative has a portfolio of nine 
projects spread out across the drug development pipeline 
for the treatment of leishmaniasis, sleeping sickness, Chagas 
disease, and malaria [6]. But Virtual Pharmas face three 
important problems. The ﬁrst is similar to the problem 
faced by subsidy proposals: guessing private-sector R&D 
costs. One needs to understand what a product costs in 
order to negotiate the best possible price—and guessing 
wrong is likely to be expensive. Second, Virtual Pharma’s 
development pipelines will run dry without more upstream 
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Box 1. Possible Licenses for TDI Discoveries
▪ A public-domain license that permits anyone to use the 
information for any purpose
▪ Licenses such as the Creative Commons Attribution License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0) that permit 
anyone to use the information for any purpose, provided proper 
attribution is given
▪ Licenses such as the General Public License (www.opensource.
org/licenses/gpl-license.php) that prohibit commercial use
▪ Licenses that permit commercial companies to obtain and 
exploit patents outside the developing world. These would allow 
Virtual Pharma to stretch its own R&D funds by letting corporate 
partners sell patented products to ecotourists, governments, and 
other consumers living in the industrialized world.
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research. Research has been particularly weak in exploiting 
genomic insights [7]. Third, tropical disease research is badly 
underfunded. For this reason, Virtual Pharma cannot succeed 
without rigid cost containment. 
We believe that a new, community-wide consortium, the 
Tropical Disease Initiative, can help solve these problems. Its 
success would help keep Virtual Pharma’s R&D pipeline full. 
Furthermore, it would use open-source licenses to keep its 
discoveries freely available to researchers and—eventually—
manufacturers. As we explain below, well-designed open-
source licenses are the key to containing Virtual Pharmas’ 
R&D costs. 
While we expect the ﬁnal choice of license to be made 
by TDI’s members, the guiding principle should be to pick 
whatever license lets developing country patients derive the 
most beneﬁt from TDI’s work. Possible choices are shown in 
Box 1. 
How It Works
To date, open-source methods have made little headway 
beyond software [8]. However, computing and computational 
biology are converging. In the same way that programmers 
ﬁnd bugs and write patches, biologists look for proteins 
(“targets”) and select chemicals (“drug candidates”) that bind 
to them and affect their behavior in desirable ways. In both 
cases, research consists of ﬁnding and ﬁxing tiny problems 
hidden in an ocean of code.
What would open-source drug discovery look like? As 
with current software collaborations, we propose a Web 
site where volunteers could search and annotate shared 
databases (Figure 1). Individual pages would host tasks like 
searching for new targets, ﬁnding chemicals to attack known 
targets, and posting data from related chemistry and biology 
experiments. Volunteers could use chat rooms and bulletin 
boards to announce discoveries and debate future research 
directions. Over time, the most dedicated and proﬁcient 
volunteers would become leaders. 
Ten years ago, TDI would not have been feasible. The 
difference today is the vastly greater size and variety of 
chemical, biological, and medical databases; new software; 
and more powerful computers. Researchers can now identify 
promising protein targets and small sets of chemicals, 
including good lead compounds, using computation 
alone. For example, a SARS protein similar to mRNA cap-1 
methyltransferases—a class of proteins with available 
inhibitors—was recently identiﬁed by scanning proteins 
encoded by the SARS genome against proteins of known 
structure [9]. This discovery provides an important new 
target for future experimental validation and iterative lead 
optimization. More generally, existing projects such as the 
University of California at San Francisco’s Tropical Disease 
Research Unit (San Francisco, California, United States) 
show that even relatively modest computing, chemistry, and 
biology resources can deliver compounds suitable for clinical 
trials [10]. Increases in computing power and improved 
computational tools will make these methods even more 
powerful as time goes by.
Just as they do today, Virtual Pharmas would choose the 
best candidates. The difference is that open-source drugs 
could not be patented. This would not stop Virtual Pharma 
from developing promising discoveries. (S. Nwaka, V. Hale, 
personal communications). Importantly, TDI would be a 
great boost to the efforts of Virtual Pharmas, because it would 
help to contain the costs of discovering, developing, and 
manufacturing drugs. 
Cost Containment
TDI would contain costs in three important ways. First, TDI 
would ask volunteers to donate their time (and any patentable 
discoveries) to the collaboration. Instead of ﬁnancial 
incentives, TDI would offer volunteers non-monetary rewards, 
such as ideological satisfaction, the acquisition of new skills, 
enhancement of professional reputation, and the ability 
to advertise one’s skills to potential employers. Software 
collaborations have demonstrated that these incentives are a 
good way to attract and motivate programmers [11]. Similar 
incentives should work equally well for biologists, chemists, 
and other scientists.
Second, we have already pointed out that existing proposals 
have difﬁculty containing costs. The root cause is patents. 
Normally, society relies on competition to keep prices low. 
Patents—by design—short-circuit competition by giving the 
owners the legal right to prevent others from using (or even 
developing) their invention. TDI, on the other hand, would 
restore competition by making drug candidates available to 
anyone who wanted to develop them. We expect sponsors to 
exploit this advantage by signing development contracts with 
whichever company offers the lowest bid. Such competitive 
bidding is a powerful way to contain costs, and is also a 
good way to develop drugs. Virtual Pharma has extensive 
experience supervising contract research. 
Third, the absence of patents would continue to keep 
prices low once drugs reached the market. The generic drug 
industry shows what happens once drug makers are allowed 
to compete. US drugs frequently fall to about one-third their 
original price when patents expire [12]. 
Intellectual Property Rights
Would universities and corporations really let their people 
volunteer? Won’t they insist on intellectual property rights? 
The practical answer is that sensible managers do not care 
about intellectual property rights unless they expect to earn 
a proﬁt. This explains why sophisticated university licensing 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0010056.g001
Figure 1. The TDI Model of Online Collaboration
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ofﬁces seldom bother to interfere with open-source software 
projects [13]. The same logic would apply to open-source 
drug discovery. We expect life sciences companies to be 
equally generous. But permitting employees to participate is 
only the beginning. We think that universities and companies 
will also donate the data, research tools, and other resources 
needed to make TDI even stronger. The reason, once again, 
is that they have little to lose. The value of their intellectual 
property depends almost entirely on US and European 
diseases. For this reason, it costs very little to share their 
information with tropical disease researchers. In fact, drug 
companies already do this [14]. TDI’s main challenge will 
be to show donors that an open-source project can keep 
members from diverting donated information back into the 
commercially lucrative diseases that affect patients in the 
West.
Finally, there are precedents for private companies 
developing drugs off patent. During the 1950s, March 
of Dimes (see www.marchofdimes.com) developed polio 
vaccines without any patents at all [15]. It then signed 
guaranteed purchase contracts with any drug maker willing to 
develop commercial-scale production methods. The incentive 
may not have been conventional, but it worked. And why not? 
The contracts made good business sense: contract proﬁts may 
have been small compared to the proﬁts on patented drugs, 
but so was the risk. Fifty years later, contract research still 
makes sense. Generic drug companies, developing world drug 
manufacturers, contract research organizations, and biotech 
ﬁrms have all said that they would consider contracts to 
develop open-source drug candidates. (M. Spino, S. Sharma, 
F. Hijek, and D. Francis, personal communications).
Next Steps
So far, we have described a shoestring operation that exists 
mainly on the Web. Except for computer time, budgets would 
be more or less the same as existing software collaborations. 
Computing would be expensive but manageable. Today’s 
biologists routinely scrounge resources from university 
machines or borrow time on home computers [16, 17]. 
This Web-centric approach would be a good start, but not a 
complete solution. Computational biology works best when 
it can interact with experimental chemistry and biology. 
Nevertheless, a low-budget computational approach is 
probably enough to generate new science, suggest ideas 
for follow-up experiments, and make new drug candidates 
available under licenses designed to yield maximum beneﬁt 
to the developing world.
In practice, an open-source drug discovery effort is likely 
to include modest physical experiments. Many academic 
scientists control discretionary resources and, in some cases, 
tropical disease grants. Furthermore, good science generates 
its own funding. We expect experimentalists to turn the 
collaboration’s Web pages into grant proposals.
That said, TDI’s volunteers will be most productive if 
sponsors back them. Charities could support open-source 
drug discovery by making wet chemistry and biology 
experiments a top priority. Corporations can also help by 
donating funds, laboratory time, or previously unpublished 
results. One low cost/high value option would be for 
companies that have already tried a particular research 
direction to warn TDI if the collaboration was about 
to investigate a known dead end. (R. Altman, personal 
communication)
Conclusion
Open-source drug discovery is feasible—that is, no known 
scientiﬁc or economic barrier bars the way. But what are the 
risks? Experience with software collaborations highlights 
the main social and economic challenges. First, the project 
will have to ﬁnd and motivate volunteers. Based on existing 
software collaborations, we estimate a required minimum 
“critical mass” of a few dozen active members. Second, 
modest chemistry and biology experiments will be needed 
to increase the chances for success. Resources of several 
hundred thousand dollars per year—mostly in the form 
of in-kind donations of databases, laboratory access, and 
computing time—would make open-source drug discovery 
much more powerful. By most standards, such risks are real 
but acceptable.
The largest uncertainties are scientiﬁc. Can a volunteer 
effort based on computational biology and modest 
experiments produce the high-quality drug candidates 
that Virtual Pharma needs? A successful program must 
(1) make a signiﬁcant contribution toward supplying the 
genomic insights that tropical disease research needs to move 
forward, and (2) make useful drug candidates available for 
development and production under open-source licenses. 
Open-source drug discovery looks feasible. The only way to be 
sure is to do the experiment—and we invite you to join us. ◼
To learn more about TDI or to volunteer, go to http:⁄⁄www.
tropicaldisease.org
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